The Greek political system in the midst of its own polycrisis era

Antonis Galanopoulos
PhD in Political Sciences, Eteron Project Coordinator

A term that first emerged in the early 1990s has gained widespread popularity since 2022. According to Jonathan Derbyshire and the Financial Times, the word “polycrisis” was the defining term of 2022. Since then, numerous analyses have raised the question of whether we are living in a time of polycrisis. The term describes a situation in which multiple different crises exist simultaneously.

Based on the findings of the Insight into the X-ray of Greek Voters 2025, a new research study conducted by Eteron Institute in collaboration with aboutpeople, we could argue that the Greek political and party system is experiencing its own era of polycrisis. There are three concurrent crises that have created this situation: a crisis of trust, a crisis of representation, and a crisis of identity and ideology. Of these three, two concern the political system as a whole, while the third affects the so-called “progressive” forces – the parties positioned on the political spectrum between PASOK and the left .

It is important to point out from the outset that both the aforementioned research and the present analysis are based on the views of citizens and potential voters of each party. No claims or estimates are made based on the positions of the actual parties, but rather on the views of their potential voters. The term “potential voters” refers to citizens who responded in the survey that they intend to vote for each party in the next national elections, regardless of their final or past electoral choices.

A crisis of trust towards institutions

The research assessed citizens’ trust in eight institutions: the presidency of the Republic, and the institutions of the prime minister, the government, parliament, political parties, the justice system, the media, and independent authorities. For all eight institutions, there was a decline in public trust ranging from 1.7% to 5.6% compared to the corresponding research conducted in 2023. The largest decline was recorded in people’s trust towards the institution of the Presidency of the Republic. It is striking that only among ND voters does the majority (73.3%) express trust in this institution. In contrast, voters of MeRA25 express their unanimous distrust.

In the case of six out of eight institutions, only ND voters express their trust in them by an absolute majority. The lowest level of trust is shown to political parties (13.6%) and the media (6.2%). None of the different party electorates expressed a majoritarian trust towards these two institutions. The universal distrust of the Foni Logikis voters towards political parties is striking, while the highest level of trust (30.3%) was found amongst the Nea Aristera electorate. This may be explained by the perception that political parties are a fundamental pillar of democracy, a view that is widespread within the Left. The highest level of trust towards the media is found amongst ND voters, but even so, we’re only talking about one in six of the ruling party’s voters (16%). Also, only voters of one opposition party express absolute majority trust in any of the institutions: over half of the potential Nea Aristera voters (55%) stated that they trust independent authorities.

The three institutions that enjoy the highest levels of trust, with approximately one in three voters saying they trust them, are the prime minister (the institution, not the individual), the government (as an institution) and independent authorities.

In part, the citizens’ crisis of trust in the country’s institutional and political structure is also expressed through their stance towards democracy. The vast majority of voters recognise that, despite its shortcomings, there is no better form of government than parliamentary democracy. This position has slightly dropped in popularity (-3.7% compared to 2023), but still remains strong (79.3%). At the same time, there is equally widespread dissatisfaction with the way democracy is functioning. 74.3% of citizens (+4.6% compared to 2023) say they are dissatisfied/somewhat dissatisfied in that respect. On the other hand, only ND voters say they are mostly satisfied with the way democracy works (75.8%). This finding indicates a disconnect between the average voter and the ND electorate, a dichotomy that is evident in many of the questions included in the research. Extremely high levels of dissatisfaction (over 90%) are expressed by potential voters of the following parties: KKE, Plefsi Eleftherias, Kinima Dimokratias, and MeRA25.

As already mentioned, this dissatisfaction does not translate into widespread or substantial scepticism towards democracy. Citizens overwhelmingly reject the idea of a powerful prime minister who would make decisions without consulting parliament or the electorate (83.3%), and disagree with the view that in some cases dictatorship could be preferable to democracy (82.3%). However, the relevant views of the far-right party voters are concerning. Such opinions are particularly prevalent amongst voters of at least two of the three parties representing this political sphere. For almost one in two voters of Foni Logikis (45.6%) and Elliniki Lysi (47.9%), there are circumstances in which a dictatorship would be preferable. It is interesting to note that potential Plefsi Eletherias voters express similar views to the ND electorate in that respect (11.7% Plefsi Eleftherias and 12.3% Nea Dimokratia), while this position only registers very low, single digit rates amongst voters of the centre-left and the left-wing parties. Similarly, one in two Foni Logikis voters (49.4%) want a strong and unaccountable prime minister. This is the only electorate that shows a significant level of support for this position, as amongst the Elliniki Lysi voters, the relevant percentage drops to 25%, while the Niki voters rank at the same level as those of ND (18.6% and 17.5% respectively).

A crisis of representation

Over the past two years, there has been much discussion about the crisis of representation in the Greek political system. High abstention rates on the one hand and the fragmentation of the party landscape on the other, combined with the absence of a dynamic opposition and the lack of a viable alternative to the government are the most important factors that point to the existence of such a crisis. This phenomenon was evident in both the 2023 national elections and the 2024 European elections, and has also been strongly reflected in the people’s voting intentions recorded in recent opinion polls. In the present research, the factor that points to the existence of such a crisis of representation at the heart of the Greek political system is even more pronounced, as it constitutes an assessment of ideological currents and political blocs rather than individual parties. 

Citizens were asked to choose which broader ideological current or political bloc could ensure a better future for the country.

The fact that the Centre-Left/Left option prevailed over the Centre-Right/Right in 2023, despite the well-known results of the double elections held in that same year, seems to be in line with analyses that suggest that during most of the Metapolitefsi era, the majority of the electorate was ideologically positioned on the Centre-Left. In one of the most-used reference studies on the divisions within Greek society, Gerasimos Moschonas (1994, p. 189) describes the subsystem of anti-Right forces at the heart of the Greek party system. This ideological divide between Right and Left, or Right and anti-Right, and the resulting partisan division was key to understanding the party rivalry and election results during the Metapolitefsi. Based on this approach, the majority of voters aligned themselves with the Centre-Left (as a political party bloc) in most electoral processes (with the exception of the national elections of 1974 and 2023). Therefore, the finding that the Centre-Left outperforms the Centre-Right in both the 2023 and 2025 surveys is understandable when viewed through this lens.

What we see in this year’s results, however, is a simultaneous drop in support for both sides, which points to a lack of trust or even contempt for both ideological currents and rival government blocs. The feeling of a looming crisis of representation is exacerbated by the fact that citizens claim that neither of the two camps can ensure a better future for Greece. This is a significant shift in voters’ preferences (+6.4%) within the space of two years, clearly indicating a detachment and distancing of citizens from the two political alternative options. Such a trend could lead to a further severing of citizens’ ties with political parties and reinforce their alienation from institutional politics and electoral processes.

An analysis of these attitudes based on party preference supplies us with interesting observations that are worth some further reflection. Potential voters of three parties mainly reinforce the stance of rejection of both ideological currents and blocs: Elliniki Lysi (54.9%), Plefsi Eleftherias (40.6%) and Niki (39.4%). It is striking that while voters of parties that identify themselves as left-wing overwhelmingly support the Centre-Left as the best option – with particularly high percentages recorded amongst the electorates of Kinima Dimokratias (82.7%), SYRIZA (87.4%) and Nea Aristera (93.9%) – only two out of three PASOK voters (66.1%) express the same view. It is worth noting that although a significant proportion of potential Plefsi Eleftherias voters reject both party blocs, a similarly large – and, in fact, even slightly larger – proportion (46%) back the Centre-Left option. ¹

A crisis of identity and a crisis of ideologies

The X-Ray of Greek Voters research employs diverse methods amongst which are certain questions that aren’t usually found in standard opinion polls, in an attempt to identify the citizens’ attitudes, perceptions, and values, as well as understand the complex relationship they form with the ideology they espouse and with a potentially ever-renegotiated political identity.

Therefore, a key question in this survey is one that invites people to state which ideological classification or identity they feel closest to among eight possible options. In a comparative analysis with the 2023 research, we can identify some interesting shifts. They are by no means radical, but they are consistent with the overall trends observed in society and indicate significant internal shifts within the broader ideological currents.

The main shift observed is that social democracy is now the citizens’ first choice (20.9%), whereas in 2023 that spot was occupied by liberalism. The increase in support for social democracy (+2.7%) is almost equal to the decline in support for liberalism (-2.9%). The electoral surge of far-right parties and the growing conservatism observed in society are also reflected in the findings, as nationalism and conservatism have gained a combined 4 percentage points. These are currently the only political terms clearly associated with the right that are seeing an increase in support. On the left, this is mainly true of social democracy, while communism is also experiencing a slight boost (+0.5%).

The clash between social democracy and liberalism is still at the heart of the debate, with these two options accounting for almost four out of ten voters (37.7%). 

It is particularly interesting to analyse the electorates’ ideological affiliations based on their voting intention. Almost half of the potential ND voters (45.7%) describe themselves as liberal, almost one in five (18.2%) are self-proclaimed neo-liberals, while one in ten (11.4%) say they are social democrats. The latter finding indicates that a share of PASOK’s traditional voters has now shifted firmly to ND, as the percentage of self-identified social democrats within ND has increased significantly – almost doubling – compared to the 2023 survey (from 6.6% to 11.4%).

In SYRIZA’s case, that is in a party that has undergone numerous reshuffles due to two splits and two leadership changes, there have been several shifts that reflect changes in the composition of its potential electoral base. More than one in two SYRIZA voters express an affinity with democratic socialism (54.5%, vs. 40.4% in 2023). A significant share of the party’s potential voters, one in four (26.1%), describe themselves as social democrats, with social democracy having become a consistent and distinct pillar of the party. Approximately two-thirds of PASOK’s potential voters (61.7%, an increase of 5.4% compared to 2023) identify themselves predominantly as social democrats. The percentage of those who identify with democratic socialism has also increased (16.9% from 14.4%), while the numbers of liberals has decreased (9.1% from 13%). Amongst the KKE voters, alongside the core communist identity (52.6%), we encounter ideological identifications with democratic socialism (17.2%) and social democracy (13.1%), although less so than in the 2023 survey. 

In Elliniki Lysi’s case, the notion that is most popular amongst the party’s potential electorate is nationalism (29.7%, up by 5.5% compared to 2023), followed by liberalism (15.6%) and conservatism (13.8%). Interestingly, though, there’s a small percentage of them (7%) who describe themselves as social democrats. A similar case is the Niki party, with a slight difference in the top choice of its potential voters. In this case, conservatism leads (28.4%), with nationalism coming in second (16.3%). Here too, there is a significant percentage of voters who describe themselves as liberals (12.8%) and social democrats (7.5%). This 7-7.5% who identify ideologically with social democracy but are considering voting or have already voted for parties to the right of Nea Dimokratia may represent a shift of former PASOK voters towards these two parties. It is also interesting to point out that the potential voters of Foni Logikis are more clearly nationalist, with more than four in ten (44.4%) describing themselves that way. Conservatism follows at a considerable distance (21.9%), while those who identify with liberalism (7.3%) are significantly fewer than in the other two far-right parties.

Potential Plefsi Eleftherias voters express very different identifications and affinities, but it is clear that the majority fall within the left-wing spectrum, with 25% leaning towards social democracy and a similar percentage (22.7%) opting for democratic socialism. Although the majority (47.7% in total) of potential voters of Plefsi Eleftherias identify with social democracy and democratic socialism, it is estimated that a total of 7.6% of them feel closer to nationalism and conservatism. There is no corresponding finding for any other party on the (centre-)left (in fact, in four of the six parties, this percentage is cumulatively below 1% and in none does it exceed 2%).

In the case of the three smaller parties of the (centre-)left, the primary identification selected by their potential voters is democratic socialism – just like we saw happen with SYRIZA’s electorate. In MeRA25, 35.9% of its potential voters identify with democratic socialism, while three other identifications are almost equally represented: 14% communism, 12.4% social democracy, and 12.1% ecology. In Nea Aristera, democratic socialism is a fundamental pillar amongst the party’s potential voters (45.8%), while communism and social democracy are represented by a significant and equal share of voters (19.1% for each ideological designation). Finally, within Kinima Dimokratias, social democracy has a stronger presence (32.6%), with democratic socialism (42.8%) nevertheless remaining the first choice of ideological self-identification for the party’s potential voters.

At the beginning of this presentation on the citizens’ ideological self-identification, I mentioned a third crisis that is currently in-part shaping the Greek political landscape: an ideological and identity crisis. Certain paradoxes are already beginning to emerge, with voters who identify with (centre-)left-wing ideologies appearing as potential voters for centre-right or even far-right parties, and an increased presence of citizens with conservative and/or nationalist views being amongst the potential voters of Plefsi Eleftherias. We can thus conclude that the ideological identities adopted by citizens do not necessarily translate into specific electoral behaviours. It is not entirely clear what voters perceive as ideology and how committed they feel to the ideology they claim to espouse.

Furthermore, a comparison with citizens’ stances and perceptions on a range of fundamental issues examined in the survey reveals a number of contradictions, and highlights the above-mentioned crisis in ideologies. Below, we shall look into a number of such examples, bearing in mind that over 40% of citizens identify with ideological notions that clearly belong to the left of the political spectrum, and that over half adopt ideological labels that signal liberal and/or generally progressive views.

In this context, a large majority of citizens (79.6%) stated they are in favour ²of stricter sentences to ensure safety and security in the country. This position is supported by every party’s potential electorate except those of MeRA25 and Nea Aristera. The percentage of potential ND voters who agree with that statement (91.8%) is comparable to those of the Elliniki Lysi and Foni Logikis’ voters (93.8% and 96% respectively), and higher than that of Niki’s voters. Just as a reminder, ND voters consider themselves to be liberal (45.7%), while those of Elliniki Lysi and Foni Logikis are mostly conservative and nationalist. The agreement rate amongst voters of Plefsi Eleftherias (86%) is particularly high – higher than all other (centre-)left parties – and almost equal to that of Niki (87.2%). Even more important, given the gravity of the matter, is the fact that 42.9% of citizens are in favour of reinstating the death penalty. Potential voters for the ruling party, almost half of whom identify as liberal, are divided on the issue of the death penalty (49.2% in favour vs. 49.2% against). Almost one in two potential Plefsi Eleftherias voters (48.7%), one in three PASOK voters (31.1%) and almost one in four KKE voters (24.7%) have a rather positive stance towards the reinstatement of the death penalty.

Another example is the subject of immigration, where a large majority of citizens (76%) believe that the number of immigrants in Greece has been excessive over the last ten years. Only Nea Aristera and MeRA25 have clear majorities that disagree with this position. Potential voters for Plefsi Eleftherias – about half of whom state that they identify with social democracy and democratic socialism – have a higher agreement rate (78.3%) than the general population average, and overall higher than all centre-left parties, including PASOK (72.1%). Moving on, we can observe social and cultural conservatism in the view that “young people today do not show enough respect for traditional Greek values” – a sentiment shared by 67.9% of those surveyed. Only the potential voters of Nea Aristera are in the majority against this view, while those of SYRIZA express a marginal disagreement. Almost two-thirds of potential PASOK voters (64.6%) and Plefsi Eleftherias voters (64.1%) agree that young people show a lack of respect for -unspecified- traditional Greek values. The fact that none of these traditional values are mentioned or defined in the question, and yet the response was positive, suggests even more that what we’re seeing here isn’t a reaction to a specific behaviour of the younger generation, but rather a conservative reflex.

The contradictions are not limited to social issues, but also extend to the economic sphere. For example, the notion of competitiveness has a high acceptance rate (80.6% of the general population and a positive balance across all parties, except for a marginal minority in MeRA25). In order to achieve this broad acceptance, the connection between the concept of competitiveness and neoliberalism and market economy logic (which, unlike competitiveness, is considered positive by only 55.6% of citizens) seems to have been overlooked. This cross-party acceptance echoes Paul Krugman’s (1994) assertion that the obsession with competitiveness is not only misguided but also dangerous. Another paradox is the diametrically opposite assessment of multinationals and foreign investment. Multinational companies are seen as something negative by 61.1% of citizens, but foreign investment is considered positive by 66.7% of respondents. This is a paradox that can be partly explained, but the diametrically opposed perception of the two concepts indicates that a large number of voters view them as almost independent, which obviously does not correspond to reality, where major foreign investments are usually made by multinational companies. Foreign investment is viewed negatively by the majority only amongst potential voters of the KKE and MeRA25.

Some centre-left parties are faced with something more than such contradictions between their ideological self-definition and the political attitudes and stances of their potential voters. An even bigger issue emerges if we look at how the parties’ voters themselves perceive their class status. The picture painted by voters is not an objective reflection of the class stratification of the electorate, as it is based on their subjective perceptions. It turns out that 44.4% of the sample consider themselves to be middle class. With that in mind, let’s take a look at some data regarding the share of voters who believe they belong to the lower classes. The X-Ray of Greek Voters looked at eleven parties. In five of them, the percentage of potential voters who say they belong to the lower class is in single digits, and three of those five parties belong to the centre-left: SYRIZA (9.5%), PASOK (5.9%), and Nea Aristera (4.6%). The party with the highest percentage of potential voters who believe that they belong to the lower class is Elliniki Lysi (18.3%). Moreover, there are two centre-left parties that have more voters who consider themselves to belong to the upper class than to the lower class: PASOK (6.5% upper class vs. 5.9% lower class) and Nea Aristera (6.9% upper class vs. 4.6% lower class). The significant gap between the two groups of potential voters for Nea Aristera (+2.3% in favour of the upper class) widens when comparing the proportion of voters who, based on their family income, have the ability to save (9.7%) compared to those who state that their income is not enough to cover their basic needs (6.1%). The margin is 3.6 points, and such a difference within the centre-left is only found in PASOK, although there the margin is clearly smaller (0.7%). As we saw above, Nea Aristera was the party whose voters consistently expressed the most progressive views on social issues and supported the most radical positions on economic matters. At the same time, it is the left-wing party that seems to attract the lowest share of citizens who feel they belong to the lower class.

In lieu of a conclusion: Now what?

It would be impossible to highlight all the findings and conclusions that arise from the X-Ray of Greek Voters research in this article. Instead, we chose to focus on the elements that shape the three crises currently unfolding in Greece, and also reflect the fluidity of party balances and the broader political dynamics that often go unnoticed. These three crises could be independent, distinct crises, emerging at different times, separately from one another. Their coexistence at this point in time in the country’s political landscape creates a polycrisis context, to borrow an appropriate term.

This situation affects each party to varying degrees. However, it is certainly a strong warning signal for the entire political system. The main picture that emerges from the survey is that of a political and party system in a state of open crisis. This is emphatically confirmed by the sense of political deadlock felt by voters, if we consider that 34% of citizens believe that neither the (centre-)left nor the (centre-)right can ensure a better future.

This is the major challenge for tomorrow: Can a response be found to the political impasse, to the reduced expectations and discontent of citizens both in terms of the economy and the practical issues they face on a daily basis, and with regard to the functioning of institutions and democracy?