Greek public opinion in dipoles: New rifts, Old divides

Costis Pierides
Postdoctoral researcher at Panteion University

Lévi-Strauss argued that the hemispheric architecture of the human brain constitutes an active reflection of the binary structure of reality. After all, in the postmodern era, almost all political concepts appear in oppositional pairs. Even today, when it comes to politics, the construction of dipoles – be they material (capital vs. labour), post-material and ideological (Left vs. Right), geographical (North vs. South) – often occurs spontaneously, without us realising it. Choosing a side in such divisions provides coherence to those who made said choice; we are the “non-others”, and that is often enough to answer the question of “what we are”. Without this “other”, self-definition becomes more difficult. Therefore, an insight into the minds of voters or a mapping of the electorate is entirely capable of identifying bipoles, divisions, and fractures within a social whole.

Eteron’s research project “An Insight into the Minds of Voters”, conducted in collaboration with aboutpeople, has yielded some very interesting findings regarding (new) polarities, divisions or rifts, and their possible repercussions, which are reminiscent of old fissions. However, before analysing them, we must clarify some important points regarding the definition, content and characteristics of those divisions/fractures: 1) the cleavage theory, as formulated by Lipset and Rokkan in 1967, sets strict conditions for the transformation of a social cleavage into a divide. Anything that does not meet these conditions remains a dichotomy or a cleavage, whereas the concept of a divide is specific and mainly concerns something that is deeply rooted in society, is not overturned by circumstantial factors and persists over time until societies undergo tectonic shifts. For example, class division is a social stratification resulting from the industrial revolution, while citizens’ attitudes towards nuclear energy are a potentially divisive issue in many Western societies. 2) In recent years, there has been a decline in the importance of traditional dividing lines in explaining electoral behaviour in Western countries. Instead, they remain a filter for citizens’ perceptions, attitudes and values towards political and social issues. In other words, ideologies may no longer directly or emphatically explain electoral behaviour, but they continue to determine values, behaviours, perceptions, attitudes and stakes. 3) Western societies are described as value-fluid. By the time we manage to map the electorates’ minds, the “pieces” have already moved; the dipoles have changed. Society is always in motion, thus making it seemingly impossible to record all its ongoing cleavages and divisions.  

The research data reveal the following possible divisions::

• An ideological interpretation of political online posts, entries or comments on social media. While 50% of the participants never comment on political issues on social media, the majority of centre-left and left-wing voters often engage in digital political activism.

• Another division that remains active concerns Greece’s participation in the European Union: Citizens are divided on the overall assessment of the country’s participation in the EU, while the pro-European or Eurosceptic stance of the parties they voted for acts as a filter (e.g. 94% of the ND voters assess the benefits of Greece’s participation in the EU as positive or rather positive, while only 31% of the KKE voters share this view).

• While the tendency to reject the Left-Right divide is growing (61.9%), citizens’ values are shaped by its content and the ideological orientation of voters is consistent with the ideologies of the parties they voted for.

[Table: Regardless of who you choose to vote for in electoral contests, please state which of the following ideological traits or identities best reflects your ideas.

ND/ SYRIZA/ PASOK-KINAL/ KKE/ ELLINIKI LYSI/ NIKI/ PLEFSI ELEFTHERIAS/ MeRA25/ NEA ARISTERA/ FONI LOGIKIS/ KINIMA DIMOKRATIAS/ OTHER/ UNDECIDED

Nationalism, Conservatism, Neoliberalism, Liberalism, Social Democracy, Ecology, Democratic Socialism, Communism, Other, IDK/NA]

• On international relations, there is a clear division regarding Greece’s stance towards Turkey: 51.6% think we should keep the lines of communication open with Turkey, even if that means making certain compromises in line with international law, so we can avoid any future conflicts, while 39.5% think that Greece should stand firm with Turkey even if there is a possibility of future conflict. On this issue, there is an underlying divide between nationalism and internationalism; voters of far-right parties (Niki, Elliniki Lisi, Foni Logikis) overwhelmingly favour a hardline stance, while those of left-wing parties support a policy of continuous dialogue.

• Divisive dynamics and a strong correlation with party affiliations seem to mark the topic of the Prespa Agreement: A narrow majority (which becomes overwhelming amongst right-wing and far-right parties’ electorates), i.e. 52.2% of the sample, considers it to be a bad agreement, while 25.7% (with an upward trend amongst the left-wing parties’ voters) accept it as positive or rather positive.

• The religious cleavage plays an important role in Greek society. At the same time, it seems to determine ideological positioning (Pieridis, 2021). For 52% of the participants in the survey, “religion plays an important role in their lives”, while for 43.7% of the sample, “religion is not significant” or they self-identify as atheists. The left-wing voters tend to be more secular or even atheist, while religion is more important to voters of right-wing and far-right parties.

• The reinstatement of the death penalty for certain crimes also appears to be a controversial topic. 54% disagree with this proposal, while 42.9% agree. It is worth noting that this issue is particularly polarising in the US, where each state applies different maximum penalties for certain crimes.

• Two opposing views are recorded regarding the establishment of private universities. 44.2% of citizens believe that “they should exist in equal status to public universities”, while 50.2% believe that “they should not exist, since higher education should remain public”. Based on the findings, it is worth noting that only ND and Foni Logikis voters are overwhelmingly in favour of private universities (87% and 72%, respectively), while PASOK voters appear to be the most divided (50.1% in favour of private universities and 42.9% in favour of public higher education).

• The immigration issue continues to be divisive. 37.5% believe that “overall, the presence of immigrants in Greece benefits rather than hurts the country” while 55.2% express the opposite view. The difference is significantly more pronounced if we compare the replies of the voters of parties belonging to the two ends of the spectrum.

• A clearly post-material issue appears to split Greek public opinion (while maintaining an ideological/electoral cleavage): 49.3% agree with the decriminalisation of cannabis for personal use while 43.5% disagree.

• Two distinct camps also emerge on the issue of the recent legalisation of same-sex marriage. 41.8% consider it to be a positive measure while 37.8% think it is a misguided move. It is worth noting that the two sides are almost equally represented among ND voters (33.8% agree vs. 38% disagree).

In conclusion, the research sheds light on new forms of political division in Greece, revealing that, despite the superficial rejection of traditional ideological identities, people’s values and attitudes continue to echo them. Today’s divisions are emerging not only in socio-economic terms but also on the basis of value, cultural or institutional stakes. Social fluidity and rapid shifts show that such mappings/ insights are an essential tool, not only for recording but also for interpreting a complex political present, whose main constant is fluidity.