The multiple dimensions of asylum policies in the EU
In recent years, the refugee issue has been at the center of public debate and controversy. At the same time, it was and it still remains a catalyst for political and electoral developments in many countries around the world.
In the European Union (EU) after many, long and complicated negotiations, its institutions approved the agreement on the Pact on Migration and Asylum in the EU. The final texts and details will follow, with its vote to be completed before the European elections.
According to human rights groups and parties, the Pact will turn access to asylum more difficult and complicated. In the next period, we will have a better picture of all relevant provisions, but it seems that the result is negative from the perspective of the right to asylum and the respect of fundamental human rights.
In this reality, it is of particular interest to see how the refugee issue has developed in Greece, especially after 2015, and how a sequence of events have affected EU policy.
The “crisis” of 2015
In 2015, approximately one million people passed through Greece en route to other EU countries. The significant increase in flows led many to speak of a refugee crisis, but the context does not justify it. We knew there were refugees at the Turkey-Syria border waiting for the end of the war to return home. After some years of waiting and with the war not ending, they moved towards the EU. Although we were aware of the situation, we were not prepared to manage these flows, so something that was actually a reception and management crisis was finally called a refugee crisis because it was politically easier to be perceived and understood as such.
Idomeni and the EU-Turkey “agreement”
In March 2016, pressures at the borders, mainly from Germany, led to the closure of external borders, which in turn led to the EU-Turkey Joint Declaration, transforming Greece from a transit country to a reception country. We all remember Idomeni with thousands of refugees trapped at the borders and the subsequent waiting period for new developments. Following the Joint Declaration, the islands of the northeastern Aegean were obliged to host tens of thousands of refugees without appropriate infrastructure and personnel, with the known disastrous results. The only positive thing was the wave of solidarity that developed and somewhat gave hope in a bleak reality. The overall management led to the creation of unacceptable reception and hosting conditions, with Moria as the climax.
The Moria camp
Moria was a “reception center” which, due to the number of trapped refugees in Lesvos, turned into an indescribable structure, operating without rules and failing to ensure minimum acceptable conditions. The experience of Moria was traumatic for all and caused international outcry through publications, reports, and documentaries with testimonies that seemed unimaginable for an EU country. Eventually, in September 2019, after a catastrophic fire, Moria closed despite a change in government following the July elections. The New Democracy government had announced closed and controlled centers on the islands as part of elements of a “tough but fair” migration policy focusing on border protection and reducing flows.
The tough but fair policy
The management policy of the refugee issue, as presented during the election campaign by the New Democracy party, which won the elections, had as its main pillars border protection, closed controlled centers, accelerating asylum procedures, and increasing returns. The ultimate goal was to reduce flows to Greece and therefore to the EU. In terms of border protection and due to EU rhetoric, the government also emphasized respect for fundamental rights. The balance between the two objectives, as we know, was ultimately not maintained, with fundamental rights being repeatedly violated.
Many legislative and administrative interventions made access to asylum more difficult, with a very characteristic example being the recognition of Turkey as a safe third country, which means that for some nationalities (e.g., Syrians, Afghans, Pakistanis) there is still a process before applying for asylum, through which each interested party must prove that they are in danger in Turkey in order not to be returned (the admissibility procedure).
The acceleration of the asylum process, finally, proved to be part of a political choice by the government, which wanted to give documents and travel documents to refugees to leave quickly (i.e. secondary movement) to other countries, mainly Germany. Many organizations describe this process as push out, which has evolved into a major political issue, and Greece is under pressure from other EU countries to stop it.
It is true that the government’s choices, combined with the EU-Turkey Joint Declaration, were successful, and flows were reduced. However, as soon as we entered the period of the pandemic, Turkey increased pressure on the EU with its demands regarding the Union.
Europe’s shield
In March 2020, Turkey, by exploiting thousands of refugees, led them to the borders with Greece, creating pressure conditions at the borders. Greece protected its borders, as it had the right to. There were, of course, incidents of extreme violence and reports of two dead, with their cases being investigated judicially by the European Court of Human Rights. Greek authorities suspended asylum access for 30 days, citing emergency needs, in violation of International Law. Greece referred to an attempted invasion and hybrid warfare through the use of refugees, justifying the emergency measures it took.
EU leaders visited the area and congratulated the Greek government and authorities for successfully defending the European borders and called the country the Shield of Europe. One of the immediate consequences of this reference was the multiplication of pushbacks from Greece to “industrial” levels.
Complaints of push backs are now in the hundreds, and testimonies of violence at the borders (both land and sea) are horrible. The European Commission expresses its strong concern and calls for independent investigations and an independent border monitoring mechanism to ensure respect for fundamental rights.
The Invasion of Ukraine
In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine and a new war began in Europe. The EU, reacting immediately by its standards, activates the temporary protection mechanism, provided for by a 2001 directive and never used before. In the first eight months, 8 million refugees come to the EU, and many of them enter the temporary protection system. The mobilization of EU member-states and local communities seems completely different from the panicked and toxic atmosphere of the 2015-2019 period. There are no reactions, reception systems absorb the shock relatively quickly, and things proceed smoothly. In Greece, there is already a Ukrainian community, and tens of thousands come to the country seeking safety and support. The reception is without significant disturbances, but the country’s resources are limited, so many decide to leave.
It is obvious that there are double standards in managing the crises of 2015 and 2022. The EU proves that when it wants, it can, and its political will is sufficient to mobilize the appropriate means to stand politically and humanitarianly as it should. This great difference makes it clear, in my opinion, that in 2015 it was not a matter of weakness or the fact that the EU was unprepared to manage 1 million refugees, but sheer lack of political will and ultimately racism that prevailed. This argument makes even more sense when one considers that the “crisis” of 2023, as it emerged due to some additional arrivals in Italy, had the 2015 crisis and not the one in 2022 as a reference and comparison point.
The Tragedy of Pylos
In the summer of 2023, a boat overloaded with people sank off the coast of Pylos in international waters but within the search and rescue zone of Greece. The tragic toll is 82 dead, 104 rescued, and at least 600 missing. The tragedy of Pylos is a black page in the refugee issue book because it was a tragedy that could have been avoided if different political choices had been made by the EU.
The events described, their consequences, and the rhetoric developed are part of a logic of deterrence applied by the EU as the main policy tool for managing the refugee crisis. In short, we make the lives of refugees difficult so that they do not come.
In addition, the political choices made by Greece are at the core of the logic of the newly approved Pact.
We still do not have a complete picture of the content of the regulations that will make up the Pact, but based on the available information it seems that the hardliners have prevailed.
It is clear from the content of the Pact that Greece has been a political laboratory for the refugee issue, and there have been many times when the EU has invoked it as a successful example of management, with several other countries emphasizing that our country’s policies are inspiring.
We can briefly mention some points that highlight the problematic nature of the Pact:
-In the new Pact, which was even advertised as the end of the former Dublin Regulation (i.e. referring to the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation), the responsibility of the first entry country remains, mainly countries like Greece to examine asylum applications. However, the period during which this responsibility lasts under the current Dublin Regulation increases from 12 to 20 months under the new Pact (i.e. remaining at 12 months only in the case of individuals who arrived in the EU following a search and rescue operation). The time during which individuals who surreptitiously continued their journey to another EU member-state (i.e. secondary movements) and returned from that state to the first country of entry, increases. Moreover, this state no longer needs to send a take-back request as in the new context a notification is sufficient.
-Additionally, the proposal for the possibility of family reunification and siblings under Dublin Regulation seems to have been rejected from the initial Commission’s proposals. Apart from the fact that it affects family unity, it may also act as a push factor for secondary movements, with the possible involvement of smugglers, with all the risks that this may entail. In simple terms, siblings are not considered family under the new Pact.
-Regarding solidarity, there does not seem to be a provision for compulsory relocation, and member-states have the option to pay first reception countries to host refugees. Let us consider what the choice of other member-states not to show solidarity through relocation and choose to pay first reception countries can lead to. The Pact theoretically seems like a satisfactory compromise between the interests of first reception countries, destination countries, and countries hostile to any migration policy.
However, the ambiguity of some rules and the lack of mandatory solidarity may put first reception countries under great pressure.
The way the Pact will be implemented is of paramount importance, as its approval seems to have been expedited due to the European Parliament elections, while the argument that we need the Pact before the elections cannot be considered satisfactory, as it essentially adopts a large part of the far-right agenda and rhetoric.
