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Democracy under Threat: Inequalities, Oligarchy and the AI Challenge

01.11.2026

Liberal representative democracy has inherent tensions, which have been described as the “democratic paradox”.1 What we nowadays call “liberal democracy” is the result of the convergence of two traditions: the democratic tradition, based on the ideal of equality and popular sovereignty, and the liberal tradition, based on the ideal of individual freedom and the rule of law. The two traditions are not identical; their articulation was contingent, but not inevitable.

Recent studies argue that contemporary democracy is undergoing changes that could push it either toward elitist forms, with limited popular participation, or toward reactionary forms2, where a nominally liberal democracy will coexist with systemic, structural racism. The quality of democracy, both in Greece as well as across the globe, is also affected by power imbalances and unequal political influence caused by ever-widening economic inequalities, the restriction of pluralism in mainstream media, corruption, and the intertwining of political and economic power, which is leading to the oligarchisation of politics internationally. The unequal power of wealth translates into unequal political power and influence over political authority. These inequalities are turning politics once again into a closed affair for the few. The underrepresentation of large segments of society – and consequently the overrepresentation of others – in politics and in the public sphere more broadly cannot be disconnected from the issue of social inequalities.3

A characteristic example of this debate was the confrontation between billionaire Bernard Arnault and professor Gabriel Zucman. Arnault considers Zucman’s proposal for a 2% tax on all properties exceeding €100 million to be a deadly attack that will lead the French economy to collapse.4 He described Zucman as a far-left activist whose ideology aims to destroy the liberal economy, which he sees as the only system that works for the benefit of all. Another obvious example is Elon Musk’s repeated interventions, not only in the United States but also in other countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany. Musk’s case stands out in particular because he is a key factor in efforts to spread and normalise the far right internationally.
In the Greek context, the shadow of the Tempi train disaster, as well as a series of corruption scandals (wiretapping, agricultural subsidies, and others), has raised questions about the functioning of institutions and the rule of law and has led to a collapse in public confidence in political parties, the government, and the justice system. It is characteristic that, according to the findings of the X-Ray of Greek Voters 2025, a research study conducted by Eteron Institute, the lowest levels of trust are shown for political parties (13.6%) and the media (6.2%).

Threats to Democracy: Social, Economic and Political Inequalities

The institutional framework in many Western countries, and in supranational organisations such as the EU, is marked by a democratic deficit and by citizens’ growing disappointment with the functioning of democracy. In a recent study by Eteron Institute, a large majority of voters (79.3%) recognise that, despite its shortcomings, there is no better form of government than parliamentary democracy. At the same time, citizens’ dissatisfaction with the way democracy functions is widespread. Some 74.3% of citizens state that they are dissatisfied or rather dissatisfied. The research findings of another project, “Unmute Democracy” (2025), show that the degree of disappointment is correspondingly high. Citizens rate the functioning of democracy below the “pass threshold,” with an average score of 3.85/10. 19% rate it as 0, thereby expressing complete dissatisfaction. The share of those who express complete dissatisfaction is six times larger than that of citizens who are completely satisfied –only 3.1% – rate the functioning of democracy as 10. The lowest ratings were found among young people aged 17–34.

Another objective of that project was to examine what citizens perceive as a threat to the functioning of democracy. Among the options, which represented different political stances, one pair of closely linked threats stood out. These are the corruption of the political system (59.4%) on the one hand, and the lack of justice and impunity (57.6%) on the other. Corruption in the political system and impunity have a decisive influence on how citizens perceive the quality of democracy in Greece, and it is worth considering what this means for citizens’ participation in politics. The third most significant threat is the political and economic control of the media (32.3%), proving once again that the low quality of information affects the quality of democracy itself. Of the 13 options in total, only one more exceeds 20%: economic inequalities that reinforce the power of elites. The last two threats are connected to the unequal influence that specific interests have in the political domain.

According to Eteron’s latest research on economic justice (2026), a generalised and pervasive sense of injustice and inequality prevails in Greek society. Greece is considered an unjust country by a large majority of its citizens (80.4%). There is also near-universal recognition among citizens that inequalities between social classes in Greece are quite or very significant (88.1%). Similarly high levels (84%) are found among citizens who believe that injustices in Greece are greater compared to other European countries. The findings are overwhelming. Inequalities take various forms for different individuals, and we should not ignore cases such as gender inequalities. At the same time, there is a shared collective sense of injustice linked to the unequal distribution of wealth and the perception that the state favours large businesses. These two issues are further exacerbated in the current period by the cost-of-living crisis and everyday inflation.

Restoring a sense of economic justice is related, beyond the economy itself, to the very functioning of democracy. In other words, beyond the pressures on citizens’ mental health and living conditions in material economic terms, we should ask how this condition of injustice and inequality affects social cohesion, citizens’ trust in the democratic regime and its institutions, and the functioning of the political system. For example, how politically active can people be if they cannot secure a decent livelihood for themselves and their families? How much time can they devote to the search for reliable information and to active political engagement? How much real political influence can they exert against larger economic interests? Precarity and injustice, in addition to their direct consequences for each person’s livelihood, also have secondary effects on the functioning and performance of democracy, and on our ability to live together in a harmonious social order.

Politics, Communication and AI

The well-known dangers to democracy described so far – socioeconomic inequalities, the far right, nationalism, and racism – are now operating in a new environment: against the backdrop of the mediatisation of politics, that is, the forced dependence and adaptation of politics to the media, and the expansion of artificial intelligence. Politics has at its core the value of dialogue, but this dimension seems to be increasingly disappearing nowadays. One expression of this development is parallel monologues and the echo chambers of social media.

The gradual degradation of digital platforms and of the quality of dialogue and content on them has been described by Cory Doctorow as “enshittification”.5 Initially, these platforms served as a means of democratising expression and, for a certain period, became almost a game-changer for the diffusion of information and the networking of citizens, activists, and organisations. Today, however, the situation has changed considerably from the early years of their operation. The digital space increasingly resembles less and less a collective community of communication –even if fragmented and divided into bubbles – and is turning more and more into a privatised field of manipulation, a characteristic example of surveillance capitalism6, whose main function is the exploitation of personal data and the securing of profits for techno-oligarchs.

What researchers anticipate is the increasing penetration of generative artificial intelligence into democracy, a development that is expected to have a colossal influence on public opinion formation, since AI algorithms are characterised by both biases and manipulative capabilities. Evangelos Pournaras, who examined this issue, raised a series of critical questions:
How to reinvent (digital) democracy to address a fast-growing deficit in democratic resilience by such challenges? What upgrades are required to build up this democratic resilience, that is the preservation of participation, representation and integrity in collective decision-making processes?7

Although the threats and risks that AI may pose to democratic politics have been documented8 in detail in recent years by academics, non-governmental organisations, activists, and others, these warnings currently seem to be ignored by the broader society. Based on Eteron’s research findings, contemporary threats to democracy arising from the use of AI are not prominent among citizens. Citizens seem to identify far more opportunities than risks in artificial intelligence. However, as Pournaras highlights, there are objective risks in the increasingly certain involvement of AI in voting processes, or in using AI to scale up and establish participatory initiatives, e-voting, and citizens’ mobilisation via social media.9

In the face of the inevitable risks brought by the involvement of artificial intelligence with political affairs, there is a growing call for algorithmic transparency and algorithmic accountability. What if we take a step further and begin to imagine ways to turn technology and artificial intelligence into a common good, or explore forms of social ownership of social media?10 The logic of exiting platforms and fortifying ourselves in “alternative” social media – practically in even more tightly guarded bubbles – is not functional and ultimately reduces our outreach and our understanding of social developments. Similarly, technophobia and a sterile reaction to the technological wave of artificial intelligence cannot be productive in the long term, when new generations will be native generations of artificial intelligence. A more productive goal for progressives across the globe may be to address the link between profit and technology, between oligarchy and the digital world. We need a modern, progressive vision for the age of artificial intelligence that safeguards autonomous critical thinking and defends autonomous democratic political action.

What lies ahead?

Undoubtedly, we are internationally in a period of realignments and political fluidity. Geopolitical crises, wars, militarism, the challenges of artificial intelligence, the greed of techno-oligarchs, and the climate crisis compose a mosaic that appears threatening. Within this context, the major stake is to try to think critically about what the future of democracy might be. We need to think collectively about how we can successfully articulate social demands for a system that is more democratic, more representative, and more just.

Democracy is not simply the form of a state or a regime. It is a political act, a process that undermines the distinction between rulers and ruled, and for this reason John Keane has defined democracy as the self-government of equals.11 The only guarantee for the future of democracy is the active participation of citizens. It is no coincidence that all the challenges we have examined, even briefly, in this article, from the oligarchisation of politics to the threats of the algorithmic age, have one thing in common: they aim to restrict the participation of the many, turning them, if possible, into silent spectators of the political game. Real democracy means reversing this trend, giving voice, choice, and power back to the many.

*This article draws from research findings from three projects of Eteron Institute conducted between March 2025 and May 2026: X-Ray of Greek Voters, Unmute Democracy, Economic Justice. More details can be found on eteron.org/en.

The original version of this text was published in Issue 14 of the European Alternatives Journal, in collaboration with Eteron – Institute for Research and Social Change.

  1. Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, Verso, 2008.[↩]
  2. Mondon Aurelien & Aaron Winter, Reactionary Democracy. How Racism and the Populist Far Right Became Mainstream, Verso, 2020.[↩]
  3. Stefanos Dimitriou, Politics in Crisis, Polis, 2025, p. 176 (In Greek). See also Nicholas Carnes & Noam Lupu, Keeping Workers Off the Ballot: How Democracy Undermines Working-Class Representation, Princeton University Press, 2026.[↩]
  4. Jasper Jolly, Wealth tax would be deadly for French economy, says Europe’s richest man, The Guardian, 21 September, 2025. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/sep/21/wealth-tax-would-be-deadly-for-french-economy-says-europe-richest-man-bernard-arnault[↩]
  5. Cory Doctorow, Enshittification: Why Everything Suddenly Got Worse and What to Do About It, Verso, 2025.[↩]
  6. Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power, PublicAffairs, 2019.[↩]
  7. Evangelos Pournaras, Fair Voting Methods as a Catalyst of Upgrading Democracy: A Trilogy on Legitimacy, Impact and AI Safeguarding, Eteron – Institute for Research and Social Change, 2026, p. 7. Available at: https://eteron.org/en/fair-voting-methods-as-a-catalyst-of-upgrading-democracy/.[↩]
  8. See indicatively Sarah Kreps & Doug Kriner. How AI Threatens Democracy, Journal of Democracy, 34 (4), 2023, pp. 122-131.Available at: https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/how-ai-threatens-democracy/.[↩]
  9. Evangelos Pournaras, Fair Voting Methods as a Catalyst of Upgrading Democracy: A Trilogy on Legitimacy, Impact and AI Safeguarding, Eteron – Institute for Research and Social Change, 2026, p. 27. Available at: https://eteron.org/en/fair-voting-methods-as-a-catalyst-of-upgrading-democracy/.[↩]
  10. Peter Dorman, Governance of Social Media: A Social Ownership Approach, International Review of Applied Economics, 2026, pp. 1–22. doi:10.1080/02692171.2026.2672999.[↩]
  11. John Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy, Pocket Books, 2019, p. 865.[↩]
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