At the center of the “X-ray of Greek Voters” project are key questions aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of political behavior and civic engagement in Greece. This research initiative seeks to thoroughly investigate the ideological and political orientations of Greek society, moving beyond the limited interpretive frameworks of traditional public opinion polls.
The project aims to uncover the fundamental value systems and perceptual patterns that shape citizens’ political thinking, while also analyzing how these have evolved in comparison to previous periods.

Political affiliation, i.e. people’s perception that a political party represents their ideals and values, is one of the foundations of political representation and of the relationship between citizens and parties in modern democracies. It is directly linked to the concept of ideological convergence, which is central to the quality of democratic representation. Previous studies in Greece have shown that the Left –Right dimension continues to function as an instrumental framework for understanding representation relations, although, on its own, it is not sufficient to explain fluctuations in political affiliation or certain patterns of electoral behaviour, especially during times of political instability or crisis (Kartsounidou & Andreadis, 2020). At the same time, the presence of a “second preference”, i.e. a second party that citizens feel close to, is an indication of a potential electoral shift or ideological diversity.
The present analysis uses data from Eteron’s research “X-ray of Greek Voters” (April 2025 – conducted by aboutpeople) in order to explore the dynamics of political affiliation and the margins of divergence in an environment defined by political volatility and changes in representation ties. More specifically, we shall analyse:
– the voters’ ideological identification in relation to their main political party preference,
– the importance of the traditional Left-Right axis,
– the presence of a secondary party preference.
These parameters reflect the dynamics of political affiliation and the divergence margins that make up the current Greek electoral reality.
Voters’ Ideological Identification
The period following the economic recession was marked by the emergence of new political parties and a weakening of traditional ones – a fact which significantly affected political affiliation and the ties between voters and parties. According to a previous congruence study of that particular decade (Kartsounidou & Andreadis, 2024, Kartsounidou & Andreadis, 2020), parties such as Nea Dimokratia (ND), as well as younger parties such as Elliniki Lysi and MeRA25, exhibited a high level of congruence with their electoral base, compared to SYRIZA, which was found to be more distant from its voters. In this particular study, participants were asked to choose the ideological identity that best expressed them, regardless of their party preference. Looking at the voters’ replies together with their voting preferences, there’s an interesting diversity in terms of their ideological identification.
A significant ideological uniformity can be observed among parties of the broader Centre-Left/Left. For example, PASOK/KINAL appears to have a significant identification with social democracy (61.7%). The majority of the voters of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) identify with communism (52.6%) and democratic socialism (17.2%). SYRIZA voters largely identify with democratic socialism (54.5%), thus reflecting a traditional left-wing base. Nea Aristera attracts voters with a clear left-wing progressive orientation, with 45.8% identifying with democratic socialism as well as with social democracy (19.1%) and communism (19.1%). On the other hand, Plefsi Eleftherias has an ideologically heterogeneous party base, since there’s a considerable identification with democratic socialism (22.7%), but also with ecology (8.2%) and liberalism (7.9%).
Nea Dimokratia displays significant ideological diversity, attracting voters who identify as liberal (45.7%) and neoliberal (18.2%), as well as social democrats (11.4%) and conservatives (9.4%). This may indicate that it draws votes from different social and ideological groups, beyond the traditional right-wing spectrum. In previous surveys, ND has consistently shown a high degree of congruence with its electoral base across various dimensions of political competition between 2009 and 2019 (Kartsounidou & Andreadis, 2020). In 2019 in particular, this congruence was reinforced on social issues (GAL/TAN), with a large number of parliamentary candidates and voters positioning themselves in the centre of the political axis (Kartsounidou & Andreadis, 2024, Kartsounidou, Tsigkou & Andreadis, 2022), a trend that seems to be continuing in 2025, thus reinforcing the conclusion that the party has a broad ideological reach.
Parties positioned further to the right than ND, such as Elliniki Lisi and NIKI, record high levels of identification with nationalism (29.7% and 16.3% respectively) and conservatism (13.8% and 28.4%), without clearly identifying with traditional ideological categories, thus reinforcing their anti- systemic orientation. Foni Logikis also displays ideological dispersion, with high identification with nationalism (44.4%) and conservatism (21.9%), reflecting a right-wing but anti-systemic discourse.
Finally, the undecided show low ideological stability, with a preference for social democracy (22.6%), liberalism (12.8%) and a significant percentage of them opting either for “Other” or “Refuse to answer”, which is consistent with the profile of politically volatile or distanced citizens.
The significance of the Left-Right axis: Is there a shift or devaluation?
The Left-Right (L-R) axis is a ’super-dimension’ that allows the comparison of citizens’ views with the positions of political parties and candidates (Powell, 2009, Marks & Steenbergen, 2002) on a range of individual policy issues in a specific context (Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976). However, reducing many different political dimensions to one can prove problematic and limiting (Huber & Powell, 1994, Lutz et al., 2012). According to earlier research, in recent years the L-R dimension, although still valuable as a basic framework for political positioning, is not sufficient on its own to fully describe the dynamics of political proximity and the divergences between voters and political parties, especially in complex and changing political environments such as Greece (Kartsounidou & Andreadis, 2024, Kartsounidou & Andreadis, 2020).
The present research findings confirm this remark, highlighting the fact that the traditional Left-Right axis, which shaped political behaviour and party identification for decades, is now in a state of constant decline. Only 37.3% of citizens believe that it is still relevant, while 41.1% explicitly reject it. At the same time, the high percentage of those who avoid positioning themselves on the matter (21.6%) is indicative of the ideological confusion or distance that characterises a significant part of society. However, this weakening does not necessarily mean the complete collapse of ideological differences, but rather their reformulation in new terms, such as identity issues, cultural dilemmas, trust towards institutions, technological developments, and opinions on science and information.
Although several party foundations continue to have a clear ideological orientation (as shown by the above analysis of ideological identification), the data show that voters perhaps no longer perceive political differences strictly through the traditional Left-Right axis.
A typical example of the devaluation of the L-R dimension is Plefsi Eleftherias, as 68.7% of its voters believe that said dimension no longer corresponds to the current political reality. At the same time, the analysis of ideological identification presented earlier shows that Plefsi Eleftherias has a clear left-wing ideological profile, with high identification rates with democratic socialism (38.5%), communism (15.4%), and social democracy (13.5%), while also displaying certain elements that mostly belong to the ecology and/or alternative identities. However, the party’s public discourse often goes beyond the traditional L-R axis, focusing on issues of sovereignty, accountability, and institutional conflict. Thus, although Plefsi Eleftherias voters ideologically identify with the Left, the party’s political expression mainly serves as a protesting voice, sometimes transcending the traditional left-right divide.
Similarly, on the broader right/centre-right, ND maintains its ideological diversity, with 66.2% of its voters agreeing with the opinion that the left-right divide is no longer relevant within the current political era. Furthermore, parties such as Elliniki Lysi or Niki are rather positioned in the sphere of conservative cultural nationalism, often outside the traditionally defined L-R axis, with an overwhelming 82% and 78.5% of their voters, respectively, considering that the divide is no longer relevant. Likewise, Foni Logikis is a typical example of a party whose electoral basis majority openly rejects the left-right classification (56.8%). This voter profile shows great ideological dispersion and reflects an anti-systemic political stance with right-wing social characteristics, but without a clear ideological self-positioning.
It is worth noting that, despite PASOK/ KINAL’s historic role as one of the main parties of the post-dictatorship era and its clear centre-left ideological orientation, or its voters’ high identification with social democracy (61.7%), still, 56.8% of them reject the traditional Left-Right axis, considering it irrelevant in the present day. This finding is particularly significant, as it suggests that even amongst voters of a party that has historically built its political identity around the L-R axis, there appears to be a growing desire for change and the adoption of new political approaches that transcend the traditional dichotomy, which is perhaps linked to a need to adapt to a political environment of increased fluidity and divisions.
Unlike parties that tend to transcend or reject the left–right distinction, SYRIZA, Nea Aristera, and the KKE show high levels of ideological consistency and a clear orientation within the traditional left-right axis. SYRIZA voters constitute a clearly progressive-left ideological core, with 43.6% identifying with democratic socialism, 10.3% with social democracy, and 9% with communism. Similarly, the Nea Aristera voters express their strong identification with democratic socialism (39%), communism (15.3%), and ecology(12.5%). These figures confirm that voters of both parties continue to define politics along the left-right axis (81.5% in SYRIZA and 69.5% in Nea Aristera), not only at a discourse level, but also as a personal ideological identification. The KKE, as we have seen, exhibits high ideological cohesion, and the majority of KKE voters (61.7%) fully accept the Left–Right divide, which is a central element of the party’s political outlook. However, the limited interconnection of KKE voters with other party bases (based on the low percentages of second preference votes from and to other parties, as we will see below) suggests an ideological self-sufficiency accompanied by political isolation.
The assessment of the Left–Right dimension by the survey participants shows that citizens often perceive this axis as a general summary of their political identity, which encapsulates cultural, social, and historical connotations, without necessarily being synonymous with explicit stances on specific political issues (Costello et al., 2012). This explains both the high acceptance of the L-R dimension within specific party audiences (such as the KKE, SYRIZA, and Nea Aristera) and its concurrent rejection by a large portion of the electorate. Furthermore, it may also explain the distancing of a significant percentage of citizens from this traditional axis, even though they maintain clear opinions and preferences on individual issues of economic policy and social values.
Second Party Preference: Potential alliances and electoral fluidity
The question regarding people’s second party preference reflects political sympathies that extend beyond their primary electoral identification, thus indicating that for a significant share of the population, their affinity for one party does not preclude an emotional or ideological connection to a second one. PASOK/KINAL is the most popular second choice, especially amongst voters of ND (52.2%) and SYRIZA (23.4%), thereby reinforcing its profile as a bridge-party that can attract voters with different ideological backgrounds. Despite its clear centre-left orientation and the affiliation of its voters with social democracy (61.7%), PASOK maintains this dynamic, thereby confirming its mediating role within the polarised Greek party system. At the same time, ND retains the ability to broaden its electoral base by attracting voters from the Centre (from PASOK/KINAL 20.7%), but mainly from more conservative parties (Niki 36.5% and Foni Logikis 36.3%). At the same time, the limited flow of second preferences towards more right-wing parties, such as Elliniki Lisi or Niki, suggests that ND maintains an organic distance from more conservative or nationalist party forces, at least according to the responses of its voters in the survey.
In the broader centre-left and left-wing bloc, there is considerable fluidity. A significant proportion of Nea Aristera, PASOK and Plefsi Eleftherias voters claim SYRIZA as their second preference (44.1%, 13.1% and 14.5%, respectively), while SYRIZA voters’ second preference tends to be the more radical left-wing parties, such as MeRA25 (21.3%) and Nea Aristera (32.4%), but also PASOK/KINAL (23.4%). This reflects a horizontal mobility on the left, with common ideological references, despite the partial differentiations between the parties. At the same time, Plefsi Eleftherias and MeRA25 voters show they’re close to each other, but also to Nea Aristera. Indicatively, Plefsi records second preferences towards SYRIZA (14.5%), MeRA25 (14.7%), and PASOK/KINAL (14.8%), thus indicating common political and ideological ground between their audiences, despite existing differences in each party’s tone and strategy.
Elliniki Lisi, Niki, and Foni Logikis show a significant stream of second preferences between them, as well as toward Nea Dimokratia, but not toward or from other parties. This reinforces the hypothesis that these parties attract voters with strongly “anti-establishment” or “single-issue” profiles, whose political affinity is based mainly on national, cultural, or religious references. This is probably why their voters reject the traditional Left-Right divide, as already mentioned. The limited connection of these electoral bases with the rest of the political spectrum makes it more difficult for voters to shift allegiances, but it reinforces the stability of their overall political stance, a factor that could prove decisive in future highly polarised elections.
An Analysis of Ideological Identification and Second Party Preferences
If we couple the analysis of people’s ideological identification with their second party preference, we can identify political ecosystems within which voters act. These are not necessarily structured around a specific party, but rather evolve around associated ideological values and broader political stances.
Centre-Left: SYRIZA, PASOK, and Nea Aristera voters identify ideologically with either social democracy or democratic socialism, maintaining a clear progressive orientation. To a large extent they’re each others’ “second preference”: SYRIZA attracts PASOK and Plefsi Eleftherias voters as a second choice, while Nea Aristera garners support from SYRIZA, PASOK, MerA25, and, to a lesser extent, KKE voters. Although Nea Aristera belongs to the radical/alternative left, it also functions as a bridge to the broader centre-left, as it attracts second preferences from voters of different progressive parties, highlighting its dual role within the party ecosystem. This creates a broader left-wing/progressive pool, where voters have similar ideological backgrounds but different strategies and political styles.
Centrist consolidation: PASOK/ KINAL is a typical core political party, with high levels of internal ideological cohesion (61.7% identify with social democracy) and, at the same time, the most popular second preference for voters of both ND and SYRIZA. This suggests that citizens who position themselves in the political centre maintain a high affinity with PASOK, even if they choose another party as their first preference, thereby reinforcing its mediating role in a polarised party landscape.
Radical/Alternative Left: Parties such as Plefsi Eleftherias and MeRA25, together with Nea Aristera, form a closed but coherent ideological space, with elements of democratic socialism, ecology, and anti- systemic discourse. Their close political affinity confirms a trend that had already been observed since 2019, where newly emerging parties showed a high degree of congruence with their audience, which partly explains the consistent political stance of their voters even in times of uncertainty (Kartsounidou & Andreadis, 2024, Kartsounidou, Tsigkou & Andreadis, 2022). The flow of second preferences between them (e.g., Plefsi ↔ MeRA25, New Left) indicates an ecosystem of shared values and strong political affinity.
Right/ Centre-Right: Despite its broad appeal, Nea Dimokratia maintains the potential to expand towards the Centre through second preferences, while the limited flow towards more right-wing parties (Elliniki Lisi, Niki) shows that the party has maintained its distance from the right. In contrast, parties such as Elliniki Lisi and Niki, which have a high identification with nationalism and conservatism, receive limited second preference picks from other parties, suggesting a more one-dimensional and static political identification.
Multidimensional analysis of ideological identification and political affiliation shows that second party affinities are linked not only to the Left–Right axis, but also to stances on economic policy issues and cultural values. Understanding these underlying dimensions helps to explain the fluidity or stability observed amongst the Greek electorate.
Conclusions
A detailed overview of the findings of the X-Ray of Greek Voters research (April 2025) reveals a complex political and partisan landscape. Ideological identification continues to play a role in shaping electoral behaviour, especially in parties that maintain a clear ideological orientation — such as KKE, SYRIZA, and Nea Aristera, which operate within the Left-Right axis with great consistency. The significance of the Left-Right axis is being re-evaluated: although a large part of public opinion disputes it (only 37.3% believe it is still relevant), this distinction remains present and valid for certain groups of voters — especially on the left and centre-left.
The second party preference serves as an indication of political “affiliation” beyond the vote. Parties such as PASOK and SYRIZA attract a significant share of second preferences, a fact that renders them key players in future realignments of the progressive camp. In contrast, parties such as KKE, Niki, and Foni Logikis show limited interconnections with other party audiences, a factor that reveals either ideological self-sufficiency or entrenchment.
The analysis of this research confirms the findings of previous studies on the Greek case (Kartsounidou & Andreadis, 2024, Kartsounidou, Tsigkou & Andreadis, 2022, Kartsounidou & Andreadis, 2020), according to which understanding political affiliation requires an analysis that goes beyond the Left-Right axis, incorporating dimensions such as economic L/R and GAL/TAN, which allow for a more accurate mapping of the relationship between voters and political parties. The preservation of ideological consistency in certain party audiences (KKE, SYRIZA, Nea Aristera), but also the existence of divergences on other issues, points to the need to analyse political representation on multiple levels in order to understand patterns of electoral behaviour and the possibilities for realignment within the party system.
The image that emerges is that of a political society with open distances but also new possibilities for dialogue and mobility. The traditional division has not disappeared, but it has been enriched with new lines of differentiation (technological, cultural, institutional) that coexist with the old ones. In this new reality, the analysis of affiliation, ideological consistency, and electoral alternatives becomes crucial for understanding not only the electoral competition but also the transformation of political representation.