A Fairer Democracy? Thoughts on the state of political expectations

Nikolas Sevastakis
Professor, School of Political Sciences, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

For those of us who critically discuss various aspects of our political and social condition, research projects such as the one undertaken by Eteron and Vouliwatch offer a reliable ground for oversight. Especially when the findings are not limited to yet another statement of ‘dissatisfaction with democracy’ but also provide a sense of social expectations (of a representative sample) regarding the big question of what ought to be done instead of what we have and which fails to satisfy (us).

The negative assessment of the state of democracy across all age groups, among both women and men, clearly reveals the depth of the problem. This is not just a Greek peculiarity; at the moment, in many countries – excluding Trump’s US, where the situation has taken on dramatic proportions – the issue of people’s significantly depleted trust reserves is predominant. What we call ‘liberal democracy’, which historically has been a web of compromises between oligarchic and democratic, elitist and egalitarian demands, seems unable to respond to the shock of today’s successive and overlapping crises. Neither to the crisis of public institutions, nor to energy and climate demands, nor, obviously, to urgent issues of social redistribution and tax justice. Symptoms of confusion, disconnection from social sentiments and widespread democratic fatigue prevail.

This worrying backdrop is also emerging in Greece, presenting its own particular characteristics. The research identifies the range of threats and citizens’ responses in more detail. Reading it in the light of developments in other countries, one can see a value assessment. For example, the identification of the ‘influence of powerful economic interests’ as a key threat for democracy, followed by issues related to the separation of powers, is consistent with a conclusion reached by various schools and trends of democratic theory: democracy is mainly threatened by the illegitimate, arbitrary, and abusive power of those who are nowadays universally referred to as ‘oligarchs’. This dimension is not only related to material inequalities but also to the sense of self-respect and wounded dignity of citizens when they feel that they do not have a say in the ‘decision-making game’.

The second element of the survey reveals a more liberal range of concerns (in the sense of political and institutional liberalism). The separation of powers is one of the architectural features of a state governed by the rule of law. As with the issue of the influence of interests, references to oversight institutions and checks and balances have a greater impact on older age groups and, paradoxically, resonate more strongly with men than with women.

Perhaps it is not so surprising that the issue of the influence of powerful interests is comparatively less of a concern to younger people. Combined with the findings of Eteron’s survey on young people (aged 17-24, 25-34 years old), one might assume that the perception of certain problems becomes more acute as people enter the workforce and collide with the deeper mechanisms of survival and family reproduction.

On the other hand, I find the demand (across all age groups) for direct democracy elements to be quite impressive. And what is encouraging is that this element does not seem to coincide with the expectation of a powerful leader who would magically put an end to the flaws and distortions of existing politics. In other words, the combination of questioning representation and seeking strong-handed and authoritarian solutions does not seem to have much resonance. On the other hand, the statement –of all the different demographics– that the overwhelmingly dominant form of political participation is voting every four years combined with the generally low culture of social and political engagement on a regular basis, confirm that what prevails is a model of electoral, competitive democracy, which is, by its very nature, a more conservative choice.

It seems that for the majority of citizens (as far as one can conclude), issues of representativeness and participatory culture are not major priorities. As already highlighted in commentary articles regarding the project, most responses focus on the idea of justice and tackling corruption. Punishing abuses and what we might call a logical redress of damages is thus the dominant version of ‘democratisation of democracy’ that citizens favour and desire. I think this says a lot about the rise of certain forms of ‘anti-systemism’ at this juncture, be that the social movements’ corrective actions in the face of injustices or the institutional, criminal investigation of a number of scandals.

Furthermore, while great importance is attached to the perceived threat of the influence of powerful interests, citizens’ responses do not necessarily equate this with a need to clash with the economic elites, but rather with the inadequate administration of justice, independent authorities, and the eradication of corruption among public officials. This element could lead to more conservative (neo)liberal approaches, despite the fact that it initially calls for the relative independence of politics from direct dependencies and illegal transactions.

So despite the discontent and dismissive attitudes, the tone of the responses suggests a correlation of ideas and political leanings that fall within a moderate spectrum. It is not exclusively or primarily a center of ‘rational elitism’ but rather a combination of moral appeals with elements of social justice and institutional reform. More room for the ‘voice of the people’ and, of course, greater accountability of the political elite, but without any signs of a strong shift to the left or right.

To a large extent, deep political fatigue and a shift towards individual and family solutions (in an environment of uncertainty and negative news across the globe) have limited the majority of society’s willingness to experiment with more robust versions of challenging the established framework. This entrenched element of fatigue and skepticism is the basis for the conservative discourse that invests only, or predominantly, in ‘stability’. The research does not reveal significant reserves of social radicalism, which I believe is evidence of a conservative shift in values (not necessarily in terms of party preferences). The vast majority of citizens do not believe in major changes to the social, economic, or political framework. Discontent and anger are focused on individuals, specific cases, and events that embody corruption, incompetence, or a lack of empathy on the part of politicians toward the suffering of citizens.