The crisis of trust as ground for the co-creation of a new social vision

Labrina Bouterakou
PhD candidate, School of Social Sciences, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

Citizens rate “the way democracy functions in Greece today” at just 3.85 out of 10, according to the findings of the new research project run by Eteron and Vouli Watch, “Unmute Democracy”. Few will be surprised by this extremely low rating, and even fewer by the fact that the word “liberal” wasn’t mentioned before “democracy.” Its omission, however, is no accident: it reminds us that, despite the prevalence of the liberal version of democracy, liberalism and democracy are not one and the same, but two distinct traditions, currently intertwined in a paradoxical relationship of tensions and constant balancing acts (Mouffe, 2008).

In the current socio-political context formed by these tensions, the scales are tipping in favour of the liberal pole, with democratic safeguards having been undermined and transformed to such an extent that we now speak of “post-democracy.” According to Colin Crouch (2006), while democratic processes and institutions continue to function normally (elections are being held, there is constitutional protection of rights, etc.), in reality, power is exercised behind closed doors by unaccountable political and economic elites, without the involvement of the fundamental subjects of democracy – the sovereign people– whose influence is limited to nominal practices of minimal impact.

Participants in the survey also recognise this trend, citing as the four greatest threats to Greek democracy: a) corruption in the political system (59.4%), b) the lack of justice and impunity (57.6%), c) political and economic control of the media (32.3%), and d) economic inequalities that reinforce the power of the elites (24.4%). The above threats form a powerful, multi-layered network of interconnected forces that pushes demos – aka the people – away from democracy: Corruption is fostered by the erosion of the rule of law and exacerbates the political system’s dependence on media groups, whose inadequate and often unreliable reporting undermines the potential for popular oversight, along with the excessive enrichment of the economic elite, which gradually erodes the governments’ bargaining power and renders them at the mercy of the elites’ interests, thereby fostering corruption, and so on. The associations with the Tempi train disaster case, the wiretapping scandal, and more recently the OPEKEPE (Greek Payment Authority of Common Agricultural Policy Aid Schemes) scandal are inevitable.

Under this post-democratic political-economic hegemony, the role of political parties is limited to the adequate management of the framework defined by the market. Through the mutual consent of center-right and center-left parties on the basic principles of the liberal doctrine, the former competition between clearly differentiated plans for the organisation of society is now reduced to a media contest to identify the most responsible technocrat. The selection of one plan, however, presupposes the rejection of another: Identifying with an “us” presupposes contrasting it with a “them.” Since the political scene is flooded with converging party platforms focused on administrative and technical issues, the points of reference that would otherwise inspire citizens to invest in one specific vision over others cease to exist. The resolution of social conflicts is thus shifted outside the institutional sphere, with more and more people turning their backs on the electoral process (Mouffe, 2010). The historically high abstention rate in the June 2023 national election, which reached almost 50%, is undoubtedly linked to the absence of an alternative plan capable of mobilising the masses and restoring confidence in the political system.

The disconnect between political parties and their grassroots supporters is also reflected in the survey findings, with participants highlighting the lack of capable and honest politicians (40.2%), dependence on financial interests (30.6%), and an inability to represent society (24.5%). Unsurprisingly, participants overwhelmingly agree that political parties disregard citizens’ opinions on key issues (80.5%), which, if taken into account, would significantly improve the quality of democracy (90.1%). The concurrent prioritisation of experts’ views (61.7%) seems paradoxical, only if we are willing to accept as “expert discourse” that which the dominant doctrine validates as such. Every “regime of truth” determines whose opinions are authorised as valid and whose are not, as Michel Foucault (1980) would put it; whose utterances count as articulate speech and whose are dismissed as mere noise, as Jacques Rancière (1999) would say. However, those who pointed out the structural inability of the Greek National Health System to meet the needs of the pandemic were also experts; as were those who denounced the inadequate preparedness of the capital itself against natural disasters, and those who warned of criminal security issues on the railway network. It is up to the opposition forces to disengage the “experts” from their post-democratic associations and reintegrate them into a relationship that takes the citizens’ voice into account.

A sign of pathology or an inherent feature of democracy?

Something that the birth of democracy brought to light – and post-political regimes are striving to stifle – namely, the inescapable dimension of conflict that lies at the heart of every social organisation, is now resurfacing through the cracks in trust. The democratic revolution, as Claude Lefort (1988) argues, revealed power as an empty place irreversibly open to contestation – one that no actor can fully or permanently occupy, regardless of how much power they may concentrate. Viewed from this perspective, distrust is perceived not as a pathology of democracy, but as an intrinsic element of it – that inseparable element that stirs up competition to inspire citizens towards a new collective vision.

It is true that when, despite widespread mistrust, conflict finds no institutional outlet, there is a risk that it will erupt through means that undermine democracy, paving the way for authoritarian forms of governance, alienation, and cynicism. In our case, however, the survey findings are reassuring: The participants’ willingness to engage in a wide range of democratic processes beyond voting, both traditional and digital, at a national and/or local level, makes it clear that they do not reject democracy per se, but rather the role assigned to them within the current version of the political-economic framework. The crisis of confidence is the founding act for the renegotiation of the position of citizens and institutions within democracy.